| 1 | 1 | | Four fallacies bedevil Britain 's energy strategy and, with it, our chances of |
| 2 | | economic improvement in the long-term. The French, who are not making our mistakes, |
| 3 | | must be amazed at our ill-preparedness, as they get ready to sell us electricity in future at |
| 4 | | prices they will command. |
| 2 | 5 | | The first fallacy stems from a fool's paradise: because oil and gas are plentiful |
| 6 | | today, they will always continue to be readily available. But the peak in North Sea |
| 7 | | production which we are enjoying today is a narrow one. Output will be well down at the |
| 8 | | end of the century and Britain will be forced to import energy on a large scale from |
| 9 | | world markets in which oil, gas and coal prices will be shooting up rapidly. |
| 3 | 10 | | The second fallacy comes from an oversight arising from the assumption that the |
| 11 | | only problem is the depletion of North Sea supplies and that this can be overcome by |
| 12 | | improved methods of extraction. But even if Britain aims at only a modest rate of |
| 13 | | economic growth, e.g. 2 per cent a year - in order to create more jobs and better social |
| 14 | | services - then by the year 2020 our economic turnover will be twice as large as today's. |
| 15 | | To support such a growth, our energy consumption will have practically to double by |
| 16 | | then. Even with an exceptional increase in energy conservation measures, some 50 per |
| 17 | | cent more energy will still be required. |
| 4 | 18 | | Third is the fallacy of the quick fix: that by a last-minute improvisation we could |
| 19 | | always overcome an energy crisis, as and when it arrives, and so do not need a |
| 20 | | long-range policy. Unfortunately, some decades are needed to build a great new energy |
| 21 | | industry of a size to match our future needs. The French have a clear appreciation of the |
| 22 | | long time scales involved for this and are building now for the future, while we are not. |
| 5 | 23 | | Finally, the fallacy of redundancy: that the development of other energy sources |
| 24 | | can make nuclear power unnecessary. To satisfy a 50 per cent increase in energy demand |
| 25 | | by 2020, in the face of the North Sea decline, we will need to double our total supplies |
| 26 | | from sources other than the North Sea. This assumes a spectacularly successful energy |
| 27 | | conservation policy; otherwise, even more energy will be needed. There is no practical |
| 28 | | possibility of output from our coal, hydro-electric and renewable energy resources being |
| 29 | | able to expand to anything like the level necessary to meet this requirement. |
| 6 | 30 | | The only way then, to avoid major economic decline will be to meet most of the |
| 31 | | shortfall with nuclear power, which could necessitate a four-fold expansion over the next |
| 32 | | 30 years. The alternatives to this are either to suffer an almost zero rate of economic |
| 33 | | growth and the social consequences of stagnation, or to attempt to import large amounts |
| 34 | | of energy, bought on world markets at crippling prices, using mainly borrowed money so |
| 35 | | long as our credit holds out. |
| 7 | 36 | | As well as economic self-interest, there is another reason why Britain should |
| 37 | | develop more nuclear power. The Third World countries will continue to seek fuel and |
| 38 | | power to build up their economics and support their growing populations. It will surely |
| 39 | | be right for advanced industrial countries, such as Britain, to limit their demands for the |
| 40 | | world's remaining fossil fuel resources in order to leave as much as possible for the Third |
| 41 | | World. The advanced countries ought thus to turn almost exclusively to nuclear power |
| 42 | | (and, to the limited extent that is practicable, also to renewable energy sources) for |
| 43 | | expanding their own future electrical supplies. |
| | | |
| | | 'The Observer', April 22, 1989 |
