Cardinal Basil Hume, Archbishop of Westminster, meditates on the moral questions posed by the crisis caused by the US air raid on Libya (April 1986) in answer to terrorist actions.
1 | 1 | The US raid on Libya, and even more its support by the British Government, has | |
2 | provoked a ferment of criticism, questioning and anxiety in the whole nation. If the | ||
3 | Church is to speak about the threat of Sunday trading, should it not have something to | ||
4 | say about the more tangible and immediate threat to peace, international security, the | ||
5 | quality of life nationally and internationally? | ||
2 | 6 | Nobody doubts that we are faced with a phenomenon of a kind and on a scale | |
7 | previously unknown. State-organized terrorism has become a new weapon in the hands | ||
8 | of regimes like Libya which recognize no morality in international relations beyond the | ||
9 | obligations of their particular ideologies. International law is proving incapable of | ||
10 | providing lawful procedures for dealing with this new form of aggression, unless its | ||
11 | actual provisions are stretched beyond the bounds of credibility. In any case, the | ||
12 | provisions of international law cannot be enforced. | ||
3 | 13 | Spontaneous revulsion from the crimes which state terrorism carries out with | |
14 | apparent impunity raises one temptation. Fear of international tension, of terrorist | ||
15 | retaliation and loss of national advantage, creates another. | ||
4 | 16 | The more obvious temptation is to seek immediate deterrence through the use of | |
17 | military force. Even though this may be more than crude retaliation and a desire for | ||
18 | revenge, the use of military force can be too costly in terms of loss of life inflicted, | ||
19 | escalation of violence, failure to achieve the aim desired, the frustration of future | ||
20 | opportunities for negotiation. | ||
5 | 21 | The traditional moral judgment about a 'just war' depended upon such | |
22 | calculations. So must decisions about the morality of supporting or participating in those | ||
23 | actions of allies which rely on military force. | ||
6 | 24 | Those who support and carry out such actions may seek, and have sought, | |
25 | justification by applying the terms and concepts of international law to a situation which | ||
26 | was not foreseen when that law was made. Nevertheless, such a reaction to terrorism | ||
27 | seems to me to be more like stepping outside the community of those who do accept the | ||
28 | rule of law. 1 fear that we may be entering a jungle of repeated violence and use of force. | ||
29 | And Britain is walking with an uneasy conscience in American footsteps. | ||
7 | 30 | The second temptation is virtually to accept the problem as intractable, and to feel | |
31 | that it is safer to do nothing or as little as possible, that there are no risks worth taking. | ||
32 | This seems to have been the position of the countries of Europe as a whole. This failure to | ||
33 | act in concert effectively explains, even if it does not justify, what the US Government has | ||
34 | felt impelled to do. | ||
8 | 35 | Inactivity in the face of terrorism also merits severe condemnation. There is an | |
36 | appeasement by collective inactivity which can be as culpable as an individual act of | ||
37 | calculated and limited military force. Those of us who recall pre-war appeasement or the | ||
38 | indifference which allowed millions of Jews to be killed, or the cruel subjugation of | ||
39 | Eastern Europe, need no reminding that evil thrives when people look the other way. | ||
9 | 40 | We need to have the firm conviction that it is perfectly proper and necessary to | |
41 | advocate the application of every conceivable pressure short of deliberate, non-defensive | ||
42 | taking of life. States ought to be prepared to act together decisively and firmly without | ||
43 | prior regard for their own national advantage. | ||
The Observer, April 20, 1986 |