| 1 | 1 | | Every major war leaves its mark on public perceptions of science and technology. |
| 2 | | The use of chemical weapons in the First World War shattered one generation's faith in |
| 3 | | science. This faith was at least partially restored for the next by the Second World War, |
| 4 | | when researchers came up with breakthroughs ranging from radar to computers. But |
| 5 | | inflated confidence in technology was again punctured in Vietnam, when it became clear |
| 6 | | that technological superiority was no longer a guarantee of military success. |
| 2 | 7 | | Now perceptions of technology seem set for another major change. We can be |
| 8 | | grateful that the Gulf War is over, and that fewer have died (on the allied side at least) |
| 9 | | than if the conflict had been fought with more traditional weaponry. But we should not |
| 10 | | forget that the war was won through a combination of technological superiority and |
| 11 | | political muscle, nor allow emphasis on the first to obscure the role of the second. |
| 3 | 12 | | We cannot afford to be swept away by what one US commentator has described as |
| 13 | | 'technophoria'. President George Bush has already described the Gulf War as having |
| 14 | | 'kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all'. A key factor has been the apparent |
| 15 | | technological success of the US war machine. To describe the Gulf War purely in these |
| 16 | | terms, however, is to invoke too much faith in the power of high technology, while drawing |
| 17 | | a veil over the social and environmental costs of the conflict. |
| 4 | 18 | | There are two areas in which we must be on the look-out for this technophoria. The |
| 19 | | first is in the future division of the research and development (R&D) budget. Indeed, |
| 20 | | military R&D spending could well go up, rather than down, as a result of a new passion |
| 21 | | for expensive high-tech weaponry. A move in this direction could quickly eliminate the |
| 22 | | chances of maintaining world peace. |
| 5 | 23 | | Secondly, we need to resist demands from Third World countries - not only in the |
| 24 | | Middle East - for sophisticated weapon systems based on the latest Western technology. |
| 25 | | Impressed with the tools of war, these countries are likely to expand their orders. The |
| 26 | | result can only be increased regional instabilities. A strictly policed international system of |
| 27 | | controls on advanced military technology is essential to prevent this. |
| 6 | 28 | | The Vietnam War did indeed provoke a crisis in technological self-confidence in the |
| 29 | | US. But the heart-searching it provoked was timely, giving birth to a movement that raised |
| 30 | | important questions about the way in which science and technology are used by society. |
| 31 | | The offspring of this movement included both legislative landmarks such as the US |
| 32 | | Environmental Protection Act, and institutional innovations such as Congress' Office of |
| 33 | | Technology Assessment. The lesson of the Gulf conflict is that we need more such |
| 34 | | attempts - not fewer - to ensure that our talent for technological innovation is not |
| 35 | | overshadowed by our ability to use technology for destructive ends. |
| | | |
| | | from 'New Scientist', March 9, 1991 |
