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A wind of change for nuclear policy

A wind of change for nuclear policy

11     If nuclear waste coloured sea and sand and anything it touched an indelible,
2 luminous purple, it must be doubted whether the Sellafield reprocessing plant would ever
3 have been built. If radioactive fall-out stained for ever the land on which it fell and the
4 skin through which it was absorbed, public opinion would not allow any nuclear power
5 station in any democratic country to remain open. The invisibility of radiation accounts
6 in major part for the near invisibility of the issue in British polities, But the catastrophe in
7 the Ukraine1) has changed all that.
28     The civil nuclear programme has profited hugely from its non-political status.
9 Although progress has been slow - nuclear power still supplies less than four per cent of
10 Britain's energy demands - it has been remorseless. Green politics has never taken root
11 here, and the Labour Party, having commissioned its own nuclear stations, has been
12 deterred for this and other reasons from becoming a Green and anti-nuclear alternative.
13 The country in fact has not seemed to want one.
314     You could see the fear that this might be changing writ heavily on television on
15 Monday night. Lord Marshall, chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board,
16 paraded across every news programme he could lay hands on. Lord Marshall is the
17 leading proponent of nuclear power, and especially of the pressurized water reactor that
18 the government wants to build at Sizewell. He was put in the job by Mrs Thatcher to
19 further a cause she unreservedly believes in too. Although unengaging to the naked eye,
20 Lord Marshall is a formidable operator. Two things struck one, however, about his
21 efforts at damage limitation after the Chernobyl melt-down.
422     The first was that he was doing the job at all. Where were the politicians? No
23 minister was put up to reassure a worried populace. Mr Peter Walker was the obvious
24 candidate. The Energy Secretary, after all, had given it as his opinion in a departmental
25 press release as recently as March 17 that 'nuclear power is the safest form of energy yet
26 known to man'. Was this not the moment for a reaffirmation?
527     Students of Mr Walker's style should have known better than to expect it. He is a
28 man who thinks long and hard before assuming a high profile on the unpopular side of a
29 controversial issue. He has already kept as far away from Sellafield as is consonant with
30 his departmental duties. A clear signal that Chernobyl presents a very awkward political
31 problem, is Mr Walker's caution in speaking about it.
632     But the second message from Lord Marshall's various appearances derived from
33 the lameness of what he had to say. Suddenly one noticed the qualifications in his words,
34 and felt obliged not to give him the benefit of the doubt. Could a similar melt-down
35 happen here? He did not think there was 'any reasonable chance' of it: that is, yes, there
36 was a chance, even though only in unreasonable circumstances. Later he declared that
37 'almost any reactor' could be made safe by spending money. What was that about
38 'almost'?
739     What Chernobyl has done, I believe, is to render irrelevant in many people's minds
40 the conventional arguments about nuclear safety. I say this from personal, untutored
41 experience. Mrs Thatcher says our safety record is unparalleled. Lord Marshall says the
42 Soviet reactor is of a kind no western country would build. And all this may be true. But it
43 misses the point of public apprehension that Chernobyl has horrifyingly awakened.
844     The case it exposes is not that a nuclear accident is more likely, but that, in the
45 improbable event of a major accident occurring, the scale of the consequences is almost
46 unimaginable. Uncontrollable events outside these shores have alerted a population to
47 what might happen within them, in such a way that politicians, and especially governing
48 politicians, may find it impossible to use the methods they have been accustomed to use.
 
     Hugo Young in The Guardian, May 1, 1986
noot 1: 'the catastrophe in the Ukraine': the accident in a nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in April 1986